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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the amending power, which could be gathered only from
the general intent and spirit of the Constitution. Un-
fortunately the Court declined to answer categorically the
arguments advanced in support of the theory, so it is im-
possible to be certain of its reasons for taking jurisdiction
of such a question.
Considering the arguments advanced in the above
cases, to establish the invalidity of the amendment, it is
undoubtedly sound principle that such substantive and
municipal legislation as there exists, restrictive in high
degree of the sphere of individual activity and existing
property rights, is out of place in a relatively unchangeable
constitution, which is properly classed as a framework of
government and the repository of fundamental rights.
Such legislation represents only a transitory wave of public
opinion and should be in a form more easily responsive to
public opinion. However, saving all of the arguments against
it. is it not possible that they were submitted to the
wrong tribunal? The Supreme Court has not the power
to take cognizance of the question on such grounds. The
Court decided that the eighteenth amendment met all of the
formal requisites of proposal and ratification and is thus
a part of the Constitution. Beyond this, the Court cannot
go. The only tribunal which can give ear to these argu-
ments is a constitutional convention, having due and proper
authority to speak for the people, the constitution makers.
"Vox populi, vox Dei."
JOS. F. INGHAM
EVIDENCE-SCOPE OF DYING DECLARATIONS-
RESTORATION OF ORIGINAL SCOPE-No case will
suggest the above heading more strongly than Donnelly v.
United States' and similar ones. In that case one Don-
nelly was tried for the murder of Chickasaw, an Indian,
in California. Evidence was sought to be introduced of a
dying confession of one Joe Dick, another Indian, which
confession was corroborated by other plausible circum-
stantial evidence. But the confession was excluded by a
majority of the court against the protest of three mem-
bers-a strong minority protest. Justices Holmes, Hughes
and Lurton said that such a confession under the circum-
1228 U. S. 243; 33 Sup. Ct. 449 (1913).
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stances would have been believed by anyone outside of a
court of law.
The majority applied the prevailing rules of evidence
and held that such a confession could not be received under
any of the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule how-
ever plausible the alleged confession might be both as to
the report of the confession and the thing confessed.
Originally the rule in regard to all declarations in
extremis was admissibility whether pertaining to civil or
criminal actions. The ground for this rule was stated by
Lord Chief Baron Eyre2 in these words, "They are declara-
tions made in extremity, when the party is at the point of
death, and when every hope of this world is gone: when
every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is in-
duced, by the most powerful considerations, to speak the
truth. A situation so solemn and so awful is considered
by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is
imposed by a positive oath in a court of law." But within
a period of about fifty years beginning with near the middle
of the 19th century, limitations were attached to the rule
so that dying statements were no longer admitted in civil
suits.
The last landmark admitting a dying statement in a
civil action was the celebrated case of Wright on the demise
of Clymer v. Littler,3 where a dying witness declared that
he "forged the second will." It is true this statement was
brought out on cross-examination and to it there was no
objection. But it is a significant fact that in his opinion
Lord Mansfield devoted only 29 words to the cross-examin-
ation reason for admission and 128 words to the real, logical
and common sense reason for admitting it. Note the lan-
guage, "it was necessary to show how it was secreted (first
will), and how discovered; the declaration of Middlecutt in
his last illness, when he produced and delivered it for the
use of the plaintiff, is allowed to be competent and material
evidence. The instrument of 1745 (second will) was equally
in his custody and secreted. The account he gave of it in
his last moments is equally proper * * * as the account
was a confession of a great iniquity, and as he could be
under no temptation to say it, but to do justice and ease
his conscience; I am of the opinion that the evidence was
proper to be left to the jury." Why was this evidence
competent? Why was it material? Why was it proper?
Was it because it was brought out on cross-examination
2R. v. Woodcock, 2 Leach's Cr. Cases 256.
83 Burr 1244.
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without objection? Lord Mansfield would not use such
language in regard to evidence that got in the record on
a mere technicality. He was too great a judge for that.
The real ground for admitting it is contained in one sent-
ence in the opinion, full of wisdom and good sense, "The
competence of evidence depends upon the circumstances
under which it is given."
Then came another celebrated case, that of Stobart v.
Dryden,4 not celebrated because of superior wisdom shown,
nor justice, nor common sense; but because of the far-
reaching effect it had in destroying the old rule laid down
by Eyre, L. C. J. and affirmed by Lord Mansfield. The
facts- in this case do not show that the witness McCree
(witness to a will) made his statements in extremis but
while he was well and strong, and in reason could not be
likened to the case of Wright v. Littler. They were merely
statements of a person since deceased. But Parke, B. went
far afield and expressly included it in his opinion with dis-
astrous results. Stobart v. Dryden was probably correctly
decided on its merits for the circumstantial guarantee of
trustworthiness seemingly was not present. The solemn
occasion of an impending death was absent. But Baron
Parke with one stroke reached out when there was no oc-
casion for it and struck down an orthodox rule of evidence
and made it unorthodox, and in its stead established as
Wigmore says, "an orthodox heracy,"--No declaration of a
dying person may be admitted in a civil law suit.
J. G. Phillimore writing in 1850 uses this strong lan-
guage in censuring Baron Parke and the whole court for
rendering this decision-"I now come to a case which, to
the scandal of our jurisprudence, has been overruled;
though I still hope, for the honour of the Bar, that such a
triumph over reason will not be considered final. I allude
to the case of Wright on the demise of Clymer v. Littler, in
which Lord Mansfield admitted evidence of the dying dec-
larations of a witness that he had forged a will. Incon-
ceivable as the narrowness of our judges often is, and
shocking as the consequences are to which it leads, I do
not know any case, from Lord Coke downwards, in the
whole disgusting series of judicial bigotry, that exemplifies
it in a manner more humiliating than that of Stobart v.
Dryden, in which this case was overruled."5
Thus has gone into the legal discard by the process of
arbitrary limitation one great source of evidence in civil
'Exchequer 1836, 1 M. & W. 615.
5History and Principles of the Law of Evidence, 554 (1850).
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litigation; a source grounded in necessity, and under cir-
cumstances which have the earmarks of truth and almost
perfect trustworthiness-all done by judicial legislation
which amounts to well-nigh usurpation.
Likewise has the original rule in regard to dying dec-
larations in criminal actions suffered, and strange as it may
seem, this limitation in criminal actions got its inspiration
from a treatise writer' and not from the courts. Sergeant
East in his Pleas of the Crown, was writing on homicide.
In the course of his argument he stated that dying declara-
tions are admissable in homicide to show the cause of the
injury to the declarant, when the latter was under the sense
of impending death, and has since died; this is so in order
that the manslayer may not escape punishment by re-
moving the only witness to his wrong doing. This is based
on the principle of necessity. Many commentators on this
statement of Sergeant East hold that it is a misunderstood
statement, that he did not intend it to be a statement of
limitation of the rule of dying declarations to homicide
cases only. It was a natural statement for him to make
when dealing with that subject. It certainly should apply
to homicide at all events, however many other crimes to
which it might be applied. This is the notion of Wigmore7
and other text writers on this famous so-called dogma of
Sergeant East.
But the courts seized on it as if they were eager and
waiting for a good opportunity to do so.8 This seemingly
accidental and innocent statement of a treatise writer was
the occasion for arbitrarily limiting a rule of evidence to
the single case of homicide which formally applied to all
crimes. Society, however, needs protection from robbery,
arson, rape and the whole category of heinous crimes, as
well as from homicide.
Upon what conceivable basis has so radical a change
been brought about? Some and perhaps most have based
it upon the fact disclosed by experience that some really do
not tell the truth even in articulo mortis, and hence it is
argued that it is deemed safer to exclude such statements
except when the exclusion might let a murderer go free. If
this was ever honestly deemed the basis of the change, it
lacks the merit of logic or consistency, for many, we know
from experience also, do not tell the truth on the witness
stand in open court. More than that, if this kind of evi-
6Pleas of the Crown I, 353 (1803).
72 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1431, note 3
8Rex v. Me..d, 2 B. & C. 605.
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dence is of such doubtful character as is claimed, how much
less should it be received, or at least more charily where
liberty, and above all, where life is at stake ?"
It is a long journey from a rule that included dying
declarations in all cases, civil and criminal, down to only
one class, criminal cases, and still further to only one kind
in that one class, and that is the declarations must be in
regard to the declarant's own injury.
Two persons are attacked, husband and wife; the hus-
band is killed instantly. The wife lingers long enough to
make dying statements in regard to the attack made upon
both. The killers are tried for the murder of the husband.
The statements made by the dying wife are not admissible
against the slayers,10 simply because, forsooth, it does not
fall within the rule. It is hearsay evidence. It would seem
that the more the killings, the less valuable are the dying
declarations.
On February 14th seven men were lined up in a garage
in Chicago and shot down like dogs. The eighth man was
thought to be mortally wounded. Suppose he had been and
had made a dying statement as to his injuries and the
whole affair. Seven prosecutions would have been de-
prived of the dying statement as evidence. Kill by whole-
sale and they may not convict you. Kill but one and they
may. What more shocking and at the same time ridiculous
situation can be imagined? All this comes of slavery to
precedent. Wigmore contends that a rule that brings about
such and like situations is barbarous" and one the legisla-
tures will have to correct.
The arbitrary limitations on the rule of dying declara-
tions lack the humane element. It is said that dying dec-
larations are of too doubtful a character to be admitted
against accused persons except in the sole case of homicide
as indicated above. If the reason for the rule is the concern
for the accused, why not admit dying confessions in his
favor? Once more reverting to the case of Donnelly v.
United States,12 the dying confession of Joe Dick, that he
was the slayer of Chickasaw, the Indian, was excluded.
If it is a good policy to admit a dying declaration to prevent
9Thurston v. Fritz, (1914); 91 Kas. 468; 138 Pac. 625.
1°Brown v. Comm. 73 Pa. 329. These states hold that dying
declarations of others injured by the same act as the one whose death
is the subject of inquiry vis-La., S. C. are admissable. In 1837, Rex.
v. Baker, 2 M. & R. 53 it was held the same way.
112 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1477.
12See 228 U. S. 243; 33 Sup. Ct. 449 (1913).
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a slayer going free, it certainly is humanitarian to admit
a dying confession to prevent the conviction of an innocent
person. If it is right to admit this kind of evidence to
destroy a life, it is humanitarian to admit the same kind
of evidence to save a life.
But some say that a dying person might lie while
he is dying to save a friend. That is no more probable than
that he will lie when dying to avenge an enemy. Of the
two possibilities, the latter is more likely than the former.
At any rate the element of mistake is more likely to occur
in the case of the injured person identifying his assailant,
than that a confessor is mistaken in whether he committed
a crime or not. The minority Justices, Holmes, Hughes
and Lurton, in their dissenting opinion in the Donnelly case
contended that the dying confession should have been ad-
mitted on the ground of a statement against interest. The
majority holding was that it could not be admitted on that
ground because the interest must be a pecuniary or a pro-
prietary one. An interest which is purely spiritual, even
though an eternal spiritual interest, did not fall within
the comprehension of the rule. So this confession of a
man going into eternity to confront his Maker, believing
that he must give account of the deeds done in the body,
with all earthly interests and hopes gone, and with nothing
to gain and everything to lose in eternity, is excluded, and
the accused must suffer the loss of his freedom and might
have lost his life, as a victim to a rule of evidence which is
illogical and unreasonable.
The minority seemingly weakened their case when they
relied on the adverse interest doctrine but utilized a spirit-
ual reasoning. Had they stood upon the broad principle
upon which Eyre, L. C. J. based dying declarations they
would have made a stronger case to do down to posterity.
Baron Evre's basis for such declarations is purely
spiritual, as the basis of the common law oath is religious
and spiritual. The common law courts might well have
gone a little farther and held that the circumstances under
which dying declarations are given are not only equivalent
to an oath, but that there is an oath. When all the essential
elements are present, consciousness of impending death,
belief in future rewards and punishments, repentance of all
wrong doing, one of two things may be imputed-either the
Great God has administered an oath, or authorized the con-
fessor to self-administer one.
How long will this condition of things obtain? With
Phillimore, and Wigmore and Justices Holmes, Hughes
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and Lurton we trust it will not be for long. Legislatures
will have to enter this field, for it is a fruitful one, and
sweep away with a strong hand this intolerable state of
affairs. In a number of states this has been done in the
case of abortion.13 Dying declarations have been extended
to this class of crimes-whether the death be embraced in
the charge or not. Courts here and there are breaking
away gradually from this senseless rule and refusing to he
bound by stare decisis which is not founded in reason.
Says the Kansas Court 14 "We are confronted with a
restrictive rule of evidence commendable only for its age,
its respectability resting solely upon a habit of judicial
recognition, formed without reason, and continued without
justification. The fact that the reason for a given rule
perished long ago is no just excuse for refusing now to de-
clare the rule itself abrogated, but rather the greater justi-
fication for so declaring, and if no reason ever existed, that
fact furnishes additional justification. The doctrine of stare
decisis does not preclude a 'departure from precedent estab-
lished by a series of decisions clearly erroneous, unless
property complications have resulted, and a reversal would
work a greater injury and injustice than would ensue by
following the rule".
In the Donnellv case seven other cases were cited and
not one of the seven were in point to support it. In not
a single one was a dying confession involved. They were
simply cases where statements were made by persons who
had since died. In one the declarant was unaccounted for.
How can such cases be in point as authority in this case
when at the time four of them were decided dying dec-
larations were admissable in all cases, civil and criminal?
Queen v. Hepburn'5 decided in 1813 could not be in point
for dying statements were not involved; the same is true
of Davis v. Wood (1816), Scott v. Ratliffe (1831), and Elli-
cult v. Pearl (1836). When all of these were decided Wright
v. Littler was still in force admitting dying confessions in
all cases. In 1836 Stobart v. Dryden had just been decided
abolishing the use of such confessions in civil suits, but it is
13Mass., New York, S. D., Pa., and Ohio include abortion in
dying declarations. S. D. also includes rape.
14 See Thurston v. Fritz, supra.
l5Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch 290, (1813); Davis v. Wood, 1
Wheat. 6 (1816) ; Scott v. Ratliffe, 5 Pet. 81 (1831) ; Ellicutt v. Pearl,
10 Pet. 412 (1836); Wilson v. Simpson, 9 How. 109 (1850); Hopt v.
Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884); U. S. v. Mulholland, 50 Fed.. 413.
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unlikely that the news of it had reached this side of the
water to influence the case of Ellicutt v. Pearl.
Justice Marshall in Queen v. Hepburn.' as quoted at
some length by Justice Pitney. He says, "It was very
justly observed by a great judge1 7 (dying declarations in
full force in 1790) that all questions upon rules of evidence
are of vast importance to all orders and degrees of men;
our lives, our liberty, and our property are all concerned in
the support of these rules, which have been matured from
their antiquity and th*e good sense in which they are found-
ed." Yes, and here was a poor unfortunate woman of a
different color than his who loved liberty as well as Justice
Marshall did, who attempted to use an exception to that
rule of antiquity almost as old as the rule itself, and gain
her freedom, but Justice Marshall denied her the privilege.
Mima Queen tried to prove her pedigree by hearsay which
is an exception to the rule, and incidentally prove her right
to freedom. She claimed ancestors running back to Eng-
land. Instead of Mima Queen attempting to establish a
new exception, Justice Marshall was guilty of striking a
blow at an old established exception to the hearsay rule.
18
There was one order and degree of mankind not included in
that high sounding doctrine.
Justice Pitney should have cited better authority than
any of the seven he did cite to uphold the Donnelly Case.
If what Justice Holmes alleged in one statement be true,
which is vouched for by Justices Hughes and Lurton, he
could not cite any better authority. Here is the statement,
"There is no decision by this Court against the admissi-
bility of such a confession."
There was a book published some years ago entitled,
"Put Yourself in His Place", that created a sensation. If
the majority judges in this case could have been present and
'8 Queen v. Hepburn, supra.
"Lord Kenyon C. J. in Rex v. Eriswell (1790).
'aThe writer is not unmindful of the fact that pedigree must
be the primary fact in issue before hearsay will be admitted. But there
is a very large minority which holds that if another fact is closely
related, or that fact is primarily in issue and pedigree is closely
related, hearsay evidence may be admitted. When a judge quotes
such high-sounding altruistic sentiments as Justice Marshall did in
the Queen case, he might have deviated slightly and given a human
liberty right the benefit of the doubt in preference to a mere prop-
erty right. It is a great wonder that the "Dred Scott doctrine"
was not proclaimed in this case in 1813 before Chief Justice Taney
had a chance at it forty-one years later.
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heard the confession of the dying -Indian, they would then
have realized that after all under these circumstances it is
more a question of credibility of the persons hearing the
confession and also of the confessor than competency.
They could not and would not repudiate what they saw and
heard when impressed with the truthfulness of the con-
iession and sincerity of the confessor. They could see in
the dying man that some thing had taken place in his
spiritual being. They could see that a Higher Power had
been working and an oath had been taken and the dying
testimony was the result. If something of this kind had
not taken place then Lord Chief Justice Eyre was talking
lunar politics or something like it when he gave out his
famous saying quoted at the beginning of this note and
which is found in all the books wherever the English lan-
guage is spoken and printed.
It is sometimes contended that no dying declaration
should be admitted in evidence in these days when religion
has practically died out among the criminal classes, 19 and
the sentiment is like this, "I am about to die, why tell the
truth? I will say that which suits my purpose." That
purpose may be to shield a friend or get even with an
enemy. This theory does not tally with the reports of hard-
ened dying criminals. Here is an example of how it is
working. Recently a gangster in the East was dying from
a mortal wound received from another gangster. A police
captain was questioning him as to who had been his assail-
ant. Here is the answer, "Oh, Cap., cut it out and let me
die in peace." The idea seems to prevail among them as by
tacit agreement, not to be a squealer when they get the
worst of it.
That point may be met by the well-known rule of
impeaching the declarant on the question of religious belief
as to the credibility. The jury should know this fact and
give no credence at all or very little in making up their
verdict.
This problem of dying declarations can be solved by
the legislatures restoring these statements to their original
status, civil and criminal, subject to the sound discretion
of the court, in connection with the facts and circumstances
of each individual case corroborating the dying statements,
and also by the court giving wide latitude to the opposition
in impeaching both the declarant and the reporter.
ELLAHUE A. HARPER
1924 Harvard L. Rev. 485.
